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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ARBITRATORS SHOULD WRITE OPINIONS FOR PARTIES AND
FOR COURTS*

JOSEF ROHLIK**
The literature of the last decade on arbitration has been dominated by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.1 Strictly
speaking, Gilmer is one in the long line of Court cases regulating arbitrability
under law.2 Under Gilmer, arbitration clauses involving claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)3 are specifically enforceable
under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),4 and, of course, the resulting
arbitration award may be set aside on the FAA grounds,5 as well as for
“manifest disregard of the law,” a standard of review developed and accepted
by most courts.6 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court appears to have retreated from
a rationale postulated in the context of Title VII7 claims in unionized
employment, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,8 where the Court said:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution
of rights created by Title VII. . . . [T]he specialized competence of arbitrators
pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land. . . . Parties

* Professor and Librarian Eileen Searls, in whose honor this collection of essays is published, has
assembled a premier book collection in our library. I will always remember that when I joined
this faculty in 1971, there was a magnificent library, and the most meager library budget. I
concluded then, and still maintain today, that Eileen is a magician. My contribution to this
collection is made with a hope that one day there will “arbitration reports” on the shelves of the
law library next to the labor arbitration reports.
** Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. For the purposes of this essay, it
should be mentioned that the author once worked for the Regional Office of the American
Arbitration Association in New York City, and is an arbitrator, and a member of the National
Academy of Arbitrators. Thanks to Ms. Deborah Hawkins, a third year law student, for her
research assistance.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. As opposed to arbitrability under the contractual arbitration clause.
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4 (1994).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
6. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 & n.24 (1953); see also Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
8. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment
concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On the other hand,
the resolution of statutory and constitutional issues is a primary responsibility
of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with
respect to Title VII, whose broad language can be given meaning only by
reference to public law concepts.
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as
complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, crossexamination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or
unavailable. And as this Court has recognized, ‘arbitrators have no obligation
to the court to give their reasons for an award.’ Indeed, it is the informality of
arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and
expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however,
makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII
issues than the federal courts.9

Unlike Alexander, which was decided under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,10 Gilmer is a FAA commercial arbitration case.
However, as none other than David Feller, who sat next to Arthur Goldberg
when the “Steelworkers Trilogy”11 was argued before the Supreme Court,
observed, in law “[t]he difference between grievance arbitration and
commercial arbitration . . . simply disappeared. The Court embarked on a new
course designed . . . to avoid litigation.”12
In terms of arbitration procedure and award, I find three differences
between grievance and commercial arbitration. First, grievance proceedings
prior to the actual arbitration hearing may be viewed as a limited species of
discovery, while discovery in traditional commercial arbitration, apart from a
possible subpoena, has not been favored.13 Second, labor arbitration awards
contain an opinion, whereas in traditional commercial arbitration, outside
specialized areas,14 such as international trade or admiralty, true opinions are a

9. See id. at 56-58 (citations and footnotes omitted).
10. See Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
11. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
12. David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory
Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 567 (1997).
13. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROC.
(INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) Rule 23 & 34 (1999).
14. As in commercial arbitration in general, awards in these cases are not published. In
making this statement, I rely on my experience. In a non-traditional area, such as health care
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rarity. In her seminal article on commercial arbitration Soia Mentschikoff
writes that “[the American Arbitration] Association puts enormous pressure on
its arbitrators not to write opinions . . . .”15 It has been observed that the reason
for this pressure is the avoidance of giving the courts an opportunity to attack
the award,16 i.e., avoidance of the propensity of courts to say what the judges
want to say, which my colleague, Susan FitzGibbon, called the “judicial itch,”
borrowing from Judge Richard Arnold’s characterization.17 Finally, traditional
commercial arbitrators arbitrate infrequently,18 whereas most labor arbitrators
make a significant living out of that profession, i.e., they have a proven
acceptability.19
I find no difference in arbitration proceedings and awards between 1974
when Alexander was decided, and 1991, when Gilmer was decided. Gilmer, of
course, is an employment case, and arguably as so, it would appear to be more
similar, in its setting to a labor arbitration case than to a “buyer-seller” dispute.
It does appear, however, that having concluded in Gilmer that the statutory
rights disputes are arbitrable, the Court is looking for the dominant intention to
arbitrate.20 In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,21 involving an
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim, while the Court reaffirmed
Alexander, it did not detract from Gilmer either, with the ambivalent holding
that the waiver of judicial forum must be “clear and unmistakable.”22
In lower court decisions following Gilmer, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals stands out. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai23 the Ninth
Circuit required a “knowing” agreement to arbitrate Title VII claims,24 which,
at least for me, can be reduced to the inquiry whether there is a valid contract
(“arbitration clause”) that evidences the parties’ intent to arbitrate. Even in
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,25 the issue is reduced to the validity of

arbitration, AAA rules require an opinion. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS’N, HEALTH CARE
CLAIM SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (1992).
15. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 857 (1961).
16. Cf. G. Richard Snell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 523
n.39 (1989), cited in Feller, supra note 12, at n.77.
17. Susan A. FitzGibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 491 & n.31 (1990).
18. See generally Mentschikoff, supra note 15 (extensively examining the role of traditional
commercial arbitrators).
19. Acceptability is a criterion for the membership in the National Academy of Arbitrators.
20. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
21. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
22. Id. at 80.
23. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
24. Id. at 1305. See also Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994)
(affirming the district court’s confirmation of the award, in part, because the plaintiff “clearly
submitted his claim to binding arbitration.”).
25. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the “compulsory arbitration clauses” as a condition of Title VII as amended.
Said the court:
In holding that Form U-4 is unenforceable as applied to Title VII claims, we
do not, of course, mean to suggest that Congress sought in the 1991 Act to
preclude employees from agreeing after a claim has arisen to submit the
dispute to arbitration. Indeed, employees in many instances may believe that
arbitration is preferable to protracted and expensive litigation and will
willingly make that choice. Because of the legal community’s recently
increased faith in arbitration, those plaintiffs are now “encouraged” to resolve
their employment disputes in that manner, and if they choose to do so, they are
bound by the arbitrator’s decision. The contract before us, however, requires
compulsory arbitration in every sense of the word, and it is contracts of that
nature we are compelled to hold unenforceable under the Civil Rights Act of
1991.26

In my judgment, one should be careful of reading Duffield as conditioning
arbitrability of Title VII claims on a submission to arbitration (of an existing
dispute) to the exclusion of arbitrability under an arbitration clause (a promise
to arbitrate future disputes). Particularly in view of Wright, one should not
prejudge a case—in the land of the Ninth Circuit—when, for example, a top
executive freely negotiates an individual employment contract that includes an
arbitration clause. I confess that I find that the consent to arbitrate, or the
dominant intention to arbitrate, in the security industry’s Form U-4 could be
problematic even under contract law, related to unconscionability, small print
clauses, and other defenses.27 Of course, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court has rejected the unequal bargaining power claim in Gilmer.28
The “practical” policy issue involved in Gilmer and its progeny may
indeed be the balancing of the value of avoidance of litigation before
overburdened courts, and the value of the policing and prompting societal
changes by courts, along the lines of Owen Fiss’s well known statement of
“bring[ing] a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.”29 As I will
26. Id. at 1199 (internal citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp.2d 582 (D. S.C. 1998) (discussing
contract principles and unconscionability and finding an arbitration clause “unconscionable and
unenforceable”). Phillips, however, was a Title VII case, and the decision is heavily dependent
on the peculiar facts of the case. Id. at 605-15. The decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.
See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
28. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
29. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).
Utilitarian considerations in enforcement of an arbitration clause have not been limited to the
avoidance of litigation, even in a situation when the enforcement of the arbitration clause was
likely to result in a displacement of mandatory rules of U.S. law by an arbitration forum abroad.
For example, in case involving an alleged violation of Rule 10b-5 of 10(b) of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the Supreme Court enforced the arbitration clause. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). The Court additionally distinguished Scherk from Wilko because,
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attempt to demonstrate, there are some decisions, which only courts can make,
in exercising their law-making function.
There is, of course, the third value, that of an accessibility, and a
claimant’s relatively quick accessibility to a decision making forum.30
Abstracting from arbitration, the access to courts in civil matters has been
chiefly regulated by costs which, in employment discrimination matters,
include the EEOC budget. I asked myself what would happen if various
American philanthropists decided to shun education, medical research, and
other charities, and instead poured all their money into a civil litigation fund
disbursed on a “first come first served” basis. Query, whether the intricate and
interwoven system of administration of justice in the United States, which has
allowed for orderly, evolutionary progress of American society, would
collapse.
The purpose of this essay is not to add anything to the debate of whether
courts, rather than arbitrators, should decide statutory rights claims.31 Rather,

among other reasons, Scherk involved an “international agreement,” see id. at 515, and further
noted that:
The invalidation of such an agreement . . . would . . . reflect a ‘parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts . . . . We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.’
Id. at 519 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (involving a
prorogation clause)).
30. See generally Susan FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 221, 260-61 n.234 (1997); Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for
Employee Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 456, 477 (1992).
31. Others have done it exhaustively. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual
Harassment Grievances: A Representation Dilemma for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMPLOYMENT L. 1 (1999); Mark L. Adams, Compulsory Arbitration of Discrimination Claims
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Encouraged or Proscribed?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1619 (1999);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims:
Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1998); Stuart L. Bass,
What the Courts Say about Mandatory Arbitration, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 24 (Nov. 1999); Harvey R.
Boller & Donald J. Peterson, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 56 (Feb. 1999);
William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for Commercial
Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against Discrimination in Employment: A Discussion
and Proposals for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 29 (1998); Harry T. Edwards,
Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting
Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 23 (1985); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Harry T. Edwards, Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the
Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L REV. 3 (1988); David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The
Declining State of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 18 (Sept. 1993); Feller, supra note 12, at 567;
David M. Kinnecome, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of
Weakening the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 745 (1999); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
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the purpose of this essay is to suggest that the proliferation of the statutory
rights may be permeating arbitration cases far beyond individual employment
cases, and that the arbitrators should write opinions that specifically isolate and
resolve the statutory issues, or otherwise expressly state that any such specific
issue is left for the courts or administrative agencies to decide, and leave it to
the parties to the dispute to whether or not to resort to courts.32
This proposition raises the old debate of whether arbitrators should follow
the contract or the law. To be sure, any arbitrator is the creation of a contract.
Today, governmental regulatory schemes are so pervasive that an effort to try
to divorce them from contracts is an exercise in futility. Besides, it is rare to
encounter a contract which would so squarely conflict with mandatory rules of
law that the only possible interpretation of that contract would be that there is
such an unavoidable conflict. For instance, a run of the mill “seller-buyer”
contract must be read against the background of a mandatory rule of law
imposing the obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement, a
contract involving exclusive distributorship must be reviewed under anti-trust
law, and a contract involving securities may involve securities law. A
conclusion that a commercial contract mandates a violation of mandatory rules
of law will be fairly rare, and a decision which would consciously sanction
such a violation should not be upheld.
Strictly speaking, the same reasoning should apply to collective bargaining
agreements. However, under collective bargaining agreements, the issue has
been often framed as whether the agreement incorporates the law in question.33
I am not convinced about the continuing viability of that proposition. In an
overwhelming majority of cases the employer and the union are keenly aware
of mandatory rules governing employment issues and employee rights. A lack
of specific reference to such statutes governing the employment area, for

Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 (1999); Leonard D. Polletta, What’s Left After
Wright? Do Employees Still Have Two Bites of the Apple?, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 48 (Nov. 1999);
Margo E. K. Reder, Arbitrating Securities Industry Employment Discrimination Claims:
Restructuring a System to Ensure Fairness, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 19 (1999);
Daniel Roy, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 IND. L. J. 1347 (1999); David Sherwyn, et al., In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water,
and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 73 (1999);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999). For an evenhanded discussion of various issues,
written before Gilmer, see Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Issues Without Unions,
66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753 (1990).
32. Compare Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of
Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 100-05 (1996) (advocating de novo judicial review).
33. See, e.g., David Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims
Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar Wright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMPLOYMENT L.J. 53 (1998).
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example, Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and FMLA, particularly in the presence of
non-discrimination clauses which today appear in most agreements, can hardly
be interpreted as limiting the arbitrator’s authority. I would borrow from a
different area of decision-making, and suggest that if there appears to be a
conflict between the collective bargaining agreement and mandatory rules of
law, the arbitrator should reconsider whether the conflict is “real.”34 If an
interpretation would avoid a conflict, it should be adopted.
In non-union employment cases it is easy to conclude that Gilmer’s
holding that choice of arbitration is a choice of the forum, by which “a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute,”35 extends to all
mandatory rules of law (i.e., to “statutory rights”). Apart from top executives,
the only contract may be the arbitration clause. In a unionized context,
arbitrators are deemed to be experts in the “common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant[,]”36 for “[t]he collective agreement covers the
whole employment relationship.”37 In 1960, the Supreme Court distinguished
labor arbitration from commercial arbitration by stating that “[commercial
arbitration is, simply] the substitute for litigation.”38 The Court’s statement
reflects the continuous and all-embracing relationship of the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement as opposed to an occasional dispute in the
commercial context. However, as Mentschikoff points out, there is often a
commonality between parties to a traditional commercial arbitration, e.g.,
when they are members of a trade association.39 She also writes: “Fact-finding
norms of an informed nature in commercial matters are more likely to reside in
arbitrators than in a jury or even in a judge.”40 Accordingly, it is assumed that
the arbitrator is an expert in the industry or the human endeavor in which he or
she arbitrates, which, today, must include at least some cursory knowledge of
some basic legal concepts.41
While it may be said that expertise in employment statutory rights cases is,
by definition, limited to the expertise in law, the familiarity with a particular
employment field should not be underestimated. More often than not, in
situations involving an adverse action by the employer, the arbitrator must also

34. The distinction between “real” and “apparent” conflicts and the reconsideration in the
field of conflict of laws is the brainchild of Brainard Currie, and gained wide acceptance as a
refinement of Currie’s original “interest analysis.” See Brainard Currie, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (1963).
35. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
36. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 579.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 578. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994).
39. Mentschikoff, supra note 15, at 850.
40. Id. at 868.
41. See generally Feller, supra note 12.
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evaluate the employer’s stated reason for the action. In addition, there must be
some reason why parties to a dispute agreed on a particular arbitrator. Of
course, if one party is deprived of a meaningful participation in the arbitrator
selection process, and/or in the arbitration process in general, the arbitration
process and the award become highly questionable.42 Most importantly,
arbitrators may decide only upon the issues submitted to them, whether by
stipulations, or by claims, counterclaims, defenses, etc., and the parties should,
or perhaps must, brief them on pertinent law. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., an ADEA case:
Indeed, we have cautioned that manifest disregard “clearly means more than
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.” We have further noted that
to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the
arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or
ignored it altogether and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.43

The arbitrators in Halligan did not explain the award.
In the 1997 wrongful termination case, Neary v. Prudential Insurance Co.
of America,44 a Connecticut district court granted Prudential’s motion to
compel arbitration. Thereafter, the arbitration panel granted summary
judgment in favor of Prudential. The case came back to the district court in
1999, which held that “based on the arbitration proceedings there [was] no
doubt that the panel’s decision [had to] be vacated on . . . [the] ground” that the
“panel’s decision to grant summary judgment was in manifest disregard of the
law.”45 Similar to the arbitrators’ award in Halligan, there was no explanation
of the panel’s ruling in Neary. Said the court with reference to Halligan: “The
failure of the arbitration panel to explain its decision in this case also buttresses
this Court’s determination.”46
There is no question that arbitrators must resolve all issues submitted to
them or raised before them, and should persuade the parties that they have
done so. In Halligan and Neary the courts re-examined the arbitration records.
I find it obvious that the lack of an arbitration opinion can no longer be viewed
as insulating the award from the court review.
Even in a labor arbitration case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
vacated a reasoned award in a labor arbitration case that did not involve any
mandatory rules of law, because it disagreed with the arbitrator’s interpretation

42. See Hooters, 39 F. Supp.2d 582 (D. S.C. 1998); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group,
Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). As a result of the Engalla decision, Kaiser’s arbitrations are now
administered by the American Arbitration Association.
43. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
44. 1997 WL 114789 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 1997).
45. 63 F. Supp.2d 208, 209 (D. Conn. 1999).
46. Id. at 210.
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of the contract, and because the arbitrator’s opinion failed to reference
contractual provisions that the court considered important.47 Judge Wollman,
dissenting, captured the essence of the decision:
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the order confirming the arbitration
award. To hold that the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the contract by
not specifically referring to the second sentence of Article XV, section 15.2,
seems to me to be an overly restrictive view of the arbitrator’s role. This is all
the more true in light of the fact that section 15.2 does not compel the
interpretation Hormel places on it.48

For me, it does not matter whether the case before the reviewing court is a
commercial case, i.e., an FAA case or a case under a state arbitration statute, or
a labor case, i.e., a Section 301 LMRA case. When it comes to statutory rights
involved in Gilmer and its progeny, it is apparent that the case may end up in
the courts, even if it is arbitrable. When it comes to labor cases involving
statutory rights claims under Alexander, it is clear that such claims are in fact
arbitrated, and may be arbitrated even though the claimant has access to courts.
Of course, if the claimant resorts to courts before arbitration, then there would
be no arbitration. With respect to the isolation of the statutory rights claims
and their resolution in the arbitration opinion, there should be no difference.
After all, the Alexander Court kept the door open for courts to defer to the
arbitration award.49
I again wish to stress, that I do not address the question whether statutory
claims under Alexander or Gilmer and its progeny, should or should not be
arbitrated. I also do not address the question of the text or reach of particular
arbitration clauses, or of their legal effects as between Gilmer and Alexander.50
I am simply saying that statutory rights have been arbitrated in commercial and
labor settings, and I am addressing the opinion of arbitrators in such cases.
It should be noted that I previously referenced mandatory rules of law as
being synonymous with statutory rights. One may object that Alexander and
Gilmer and its progeny involve, conceptually, discrimination claims. On the
one hand, it is evident that rules of law relating to discrimination have had a
special significance in “remaking” of the American society, even though such
statutory rules have equal normative value as other mandatory rules of law.
On the other hand, there are other laws that grant important rights to
employees, for instance, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”).51 Although containing blanket references to discrimination,52

47. George A. Hormel & Co. v. UFCW Local 9, 879 F.2d 347, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1988)
48. Id. at 352.
49. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
50. See generally Feller, supra note 33.
51. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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FMLA confers important entitlement on employees, as do many other laws
protecting employees. One can even imagine, in this time of increasing
propensity of many employers to invade more and more of their employees’
privacy,53 that there could appear some new statutory employee safeguards in
this area.
What follows are three examples of what I consider to be cases involving
statutory rights in arbitration, in which the arbitrator isolated the statutory issue
in the opinion.54
Case Number 1
The first case arose under a collective bargaining agreement. A supervisor
found folding chairs and a table in a building housing electrical equipment.
The building had a flat roof, and, occasionally, an employee was dispatched to
sweep the roof. There was a no entry sign on the building. As a result of the
supervisor’s discovery, the employer placed a hidden camera on the roof
without bargaining with the Union about the placement of the camera. The
tape showed several employees smoking what the employer determined was
marijuana. The employees were confronted with the tape, confessed to
smoking marijuana, and were discharged.
The Union raised the NLRB decision in Colgate-Palmolive Company and
Local 15, International Chemical Workers Union.55 Colgate-Palmolive
installed surveillance camera in a restroom and a fitness center. The Board
held that the installation of surveillance cameras was a mandatory bargaining
subject, and that the Colgate-Palmolive failure and refusal to bargain at the
request of its union violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of NLRA.
The arbitrator denied the grievance with a specific statement that the roof of
the building in question was very different from a frequently visited restroom
and a fitness center. The arbitrator also pointed out that reinstatement of
discharged employees is not mandatory, even if a violation of the duty to
bargain is found. On the question of the violation of the duty to bargain the
arbitrator referred the parties to the NLRB.

52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 (a)(6), (b)(4)-(5). See Malin, supra note 32, at n.4.
53. See, e.g., Barbara Ehrenreich, Warning: This Is a Rights-Free Workplace, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 5, 2000, at 88.
54. The cases were selected because of the disposition of the statutory issue, and the facts
were patterned on real cases. Parties did not authorize the disclosure of their identity.
55. Case No. 9-CA-32158, 1997 NLRB LEXIS 309 (Apr. 23, 1997).
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Case Number 2
A highly skilled engineer, a college graduate, was dismissed from a demanding
job after coming to work four hours late. He said that he had “car trouble.”
He was told that he had arrived late some twenty-five times during the two
years preceding his dismissal.
The engineer testified without contradiction that his children had asthma, and
that he had to bring them to a physician when they had an acute asthmatic
attack. He introduced into evidence physician’s certificates covering twelve of
the prior twenty-five late arrivals to work. He also testified without
contradiction that on the other occasions either his son or daughter had an
attack which did not require a visit to a physician, but which prevented them
from going to school. It was stipulated that the engineer once told his
supervisor about his children’s condition. The engineer claimed that under the
statute, the employer had an obligation to investigate whether he was entitled
to FMLA leave which would have covered his late arrivals to work. He
claimed that the employer furnished employees only with general statements
about FMLA, and did not specifically advise him that he would be entitled to
an intermittent leave on account of his children’s condition, even though the
employer knew of that condition.
It was stipulated that asthma was a qualifying condition under the Department
of Labor Regulations.56 It was further stipulated that the engineer never
requested leave, and that the employer heard about his reasons for being late
for the first time after his dismissal.
The arbitrator held that the statute and the regulations were not sufficiently
clear on the issue of the employer’s responsibility to investigate under the
circumstances of this case, and that there was a paucity of court decisions on
this subject. The arbitrator interpreted the statute as requiring the employee at
the very least to advise the employer of the reasons for his late arrivals when
they occurred, so that the employer could request appropriate medical
documentation.
This case could have occurred either in non-union employment or under a
collective bargaining agreement. Under a collective bargaining agreement
there would have been a further issue of the engineer’s failure to grieve
progressive discipline.

Case Number 3
An African-American employee became disgruntled after a dismissal of a
close friend. He was seen carrying a gun. He had several altercations with coemployees. After an irrational altercation with a guard over a locked door into
a building, he was told to stay at home pending investigation. During the
56. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(iii)(C) (1999).
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investigation the employer discovered that the employee made several serious
threats against the employer and some co-employees, in front of several coemployees and strangers, all of whom testified. The threats involved
references to the Oklahoma federal building bombing, to the employee’s
prowess with his gun, etc. The employee was dismissed.
The employee did not dispute the testimony about the threats he made. He
testified that he behaved as he behaved because of the pervasive racism in the
workplace. It was admitted that one of the witnesses had routinely called him
“nigger.” He testified without contradiction that the previously dismissed
employee was his only friend at work, and that the guard with whom he had
the last altercation had always been hostile to him.
At the time of the arbitration hearing the employee has already filed a
complaint with the EEOC, but stated on the record that he willingly
participated in the arbitration.
The arbitrator concluded that the threats were serious, and given the
employee’s behavior, that the employer had to take the threats seriously, as the
employer claimed. The arbitrator also concluded that the employee worked in
a hostile environment. Faced with the conflicting policy issues, the arbitrator
held that given the contemporary environment of workplace violence, a policy
decision to grant the relief the employee asked for, which included
reinstatement to the only job he has ever had, had to be left to the courts.
Again, this case could have arisen in both, non-union employment or under a
collective bargaining agreement.

Several comments should be made about these three cases. First, as the
critics of Gilmer fear, each claimant lost. In addition, while the statutory
issues were isolated and addressed, the facts controlled each of the three
decisions. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Cole v. Burns
International Security Services 57 “[m]ost employment discrimination claims
are entirely factual in nature . . . .”58
Second, all three cases could end before public bodies even after the
arbitration award was rendered. In the first case, NLRB has original
jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims but can, of course, defer to the
arbitration award. I am not sure whether Alexander would extend to the
second case, but if the third case arose under a collective bargaining
agreement, federal courts could ignore the award and conduct a trial, under
Alexander. However, the awards in the second and third cases could end up in

57. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
58. Id. at 1487. See also Judge Edward’s comments on Cole in Harry T. Edwards, Where
Are We Heading With Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment? (paper
presented at an “Alternative Dispute Resolution” conference at Georgia State University’s W.J.
Usery, Jr. Center for the Workplace (Nov. 2, 1999)).
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the courts pursuant to a motion to vacate. Courts would review such awards
under the manifest disregard of law, or violation of public policy standards.59
As noted by the Cole court:
[I]n the vast majority of cases, judicial review of legal determinations to ensure
compliance with public law should have no adverse impact on the arbitration
process.[FN] Nonetheless, there will be some cases in which novel or difficult
legal issues are presented demanding judicial judgment. In such cases, the
courts are empowered to review an arbitrator’s award to ensure that its
resolution of public law issues is correct. Indeed, at oral argument, Burns
conceded the courts’ authority to engage in such review. Because meaningful
judicial review of public law issues is available, Cole’s agreement to arbitrate
is not unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. 60
[FN] The Hoyman/Stallworth study of arbital awards in discrimination cases
found that, even in cases where de novo review was available under Alexander,
only 1.2% of all discrimination cases were reversed by the courts. See
[Michele] Hoyman & [Lamont E.] Stallworth, [Grievances in the Aftermath of
Gardner-Denver,] 39 ARB. J. [49,] at 55 (Sept. 1984).

Third, the arbitration clauses involved in all three cases pre-dated the
dispute. All the cases involved attorneys on both sides, who filed adequate
post-hearing briefs dealing with the relevant statutory issues. In the first case,
a court reporter was present when the arbitrator walked into the room. In the
second case, there was no transcript. In the third case, a court reporter was
called at the arbitrator’s request. No issue of discovery was brought to the
arbitrators’ attention nor were any pre-hearing conferences held in either case.
In the third case the arbitrator signed several subpoenae prepared by each
party.
Fourth, in each case the arbitrator was a lawyer, appointed directly by the
parties. The arbitrator’s knowledge of law was not discussed. In all three
cases the arbitrator was neither on a roster of employment arbitrators of any
agency, nor underwent any training in employment arbitration. In addition,
none of the parties submitted any agency rules, such as American Arbitration
Association Rules,61 nor did the arbitrator discuss the Due Process Protocol.62
Fifth, in the first case, as is customary, each party equally paid the
arbitrator’s fees. For the purpose of this essay it is assumed that the arbitrators
in the second and third cases were paid from an escrow account.

59. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
60. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487. See also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
61. Arbitration: AAA Issues Revised Rules; Officials Discuss Training Program, DAILY
LABOR REP., May 28, 1997
62. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out
of the Employment Relationship, DAILY LABOR REP., May 11, 1995.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

946

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:933

In the first case, NLRB could very possibly hold that Colgate-Palmolive
applies to placement of hidden cameras anywhere on an employer’s property
and could further hold that the policy of deterrence requires reinstatement of
all discharged employees.
If the second and third cases arose under collective bargaining agreements,
then under Alexander, as previously noted, a de novo trial could be conducted
in the third case. However, even if the two cases reached a court on motions to
vacate, the courts would essentially be faced with answering clearly stated
questions. A court deciding the second case could resort to law-making and
hold that when an employer is faced with an employee’s unexplained absences
but has notice that FMLA might cover the employee’s situation, the spirit of
FMLA mandates that the employer further investigate the situation, to provide
the employee with an individualized notification of his or her rights under the
Act. A court deciding the third case could conclude that as a policy matter, the
policy underlying Title VII must prevail over any consideration of workplace
violence. It appears to me that these two hypothetical conclusions may be
made only by courts.
If the second and third cases were arbitrated under collective bargaining
agreements, the arbitrator would not be covered by the Due Process Protocol or
by the AAA Rules cited with approval by the Cole court.63 Yet, if these cases
were arbitrated in a non-union setting, then, arguably, the failure to precisely
satisfy the Due Process Protocol or AAA Rules could possibly be considered
an independent reason for the vacation of the award. That result appears to me
to be nonsensical, even if explainable by the de novo trial under Alexander, as
opposed to judicial review of the commercial arbitration award only under the
FAA and the manifest disregard of the law standard. As David Feller wrote,
“[t]he standard for review of an arbitrator’s decision in a non-union situation is
presently uncertain. But that standard, whatever it may ultimately turn out to
be, should apply whether the arbitration is pursuant to a unilaterally imposed
requirement or by virtue of a collective bargaining agreement.”64 Various
standards of review or reasons for vacation are normative terms which
American courts interpret in their pursuit of justice-making. American courts,
first of all, decide individual cases. They may do so by strictly following
precedents, by lawmaking, or by molding the law or facts to reach the result
they wish to reach. A well-reasoned arbitration opinion that isolates the
statutory issues and explains their resolution should be the only requirement in
any arbitration case involving statutory rights. It would certainly allow for
“focused review” suggested in Cole.65

63. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480.
64. See Feller, supra note 33, at 81.
65. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.
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There are no statistics regarding the number of statutory rights cases
arbitrated in non-union setting66 or the number of labor cases that involve
statutory rights.67 However, I will assert, based on discussions with fellow
arbitrators and on my own practice that, for instance, FMLA is finding its way
into a substantial number of common absenteeism cases under collective
bargaining agreements.
I do not believe it possible that the standard of review of any and all
arbitration awards involving at least statutory rights of employees will not be
unified.68 After all, as far as the substantive statutory rights are concerned,
there is no notable difference between unionized and non-unionized
employees. Additionally, the application of the scheme tends to spread to
similar cases when the courts start the process of development of a regulatory
scheme.
It would be most unfortunate if courts vacated arbitration awards for
failure to adhere to private standards such as the AAA Rules, even if
sanctioned by courts, and irrespective whether they are called procedural
guarantees or anything else,69 unless the court would find the lack of basic
fairness prejudicial to either party. Arbitration would lose its identity, and
“arbitrators” would become “mini-judges” administering a second tier of
justice under centralized rules.70 Of course, the obvious retort is that the
current arbitration is a second tier of justice. In general, it certainly has not
been justice imposed on the parties, but rather traditionally has been a dispute
resolution process desired by the parties. That should be viewed as a value in a
democratic society. Labor arbitration has been “an instrument of industrial
self-governance”71 which has served this country well. An ability to destroy it

66. It even cannot be assumed that post-Gilmer arbitration schemes of employers will be
utilized in cases of statutory rights only. I know of two large employers who promulgated
arbitration schemes in reaction to Gilmer. However, to date, each employer has had only one
arbitration, each involving a dismissal for specific substandard performance rather than involving
any statutory rights.
67. Survey of reported cases is beyond the scope of this essay. However, it is very unlikely
that most labor awards are reported.
68. Judge Edwards, a former arbitrator and law professor, highlights the differences between
labor and commercial arbitration in his majority opinion in Cole and relies on that difference
throughout the opinion, citing several well-known authors. Of course, Cole involved
enforcement of an arbitration award. See also FitzGibbon, supra note 29, at 258-60.
69. For the proposition that the court should vacate the award if “not satisfied with
procedural guarantees” see for example, Monica Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 844, 882, 883 (1999).
70. Edward Brunet uses the term “Judicialized Arbitration” to describe the current “Contract
Model of Arbitration.” See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 45 (1999).
71. Estreicher, supra note 33, at 757.
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by making a statutory rights claim in any given arbitration proceedings is
hardly desirable. Commercial arbitration is an ancient and traditional method
of dispute resolution throughout the world.72
In conclusion, I believe that reasoned arbitration opinions isolating and
resolving statutory rights issues are desirable for the parties who would know
why their dispute was decided as it was decided, and also would simplify the
task of courts in reviewing arbitration awards. In addition, such awards would
permit the resolution of the question whether arbitration is a suitable forum for
disputes involving statutory rights on an empirical basis, without theoretical
“second-guessing.”

72. Mentschikoff, supra note 15, at 850.

